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Keep in mind that X11 is a protocol, so the client might not be running as your user on your local machine, it could be a dedicated machine that's only running the client.

In this case, again it's not important because in our timeline X11 is old, you might proxy the clipboard feature, with a trusted and untrusted connection, the untrusted connection needs to be careful because it's exposed to arbitrary nastiness from potentially hostile untrusted clipboard-using software - the trusted one talks to everybody else. So an example is you might decide to sanitize text, strip out invisible control characters, and exclude "rich" text formats that might conceal attacks. Or you might allow some images but only after previewing them and constraining their properties, no 18GB GIFs please, yes it's technically possible to encode a huge truecolor image as a single GIF no I don't want that in my clipboard.

Is this something we should try to implement? Probably not, but in a world where people try to kite surf across the English channel it's nowhere close to the craziest hobby.





> Keep in mind that X11 is a protocol, so the client might not be running as your user on your local machine, it could be a dedicated machine that's only running the client.

For an X server to be network exposed, you first have to either SSH forward it or remove the nowadays-default "-nolisten TCP", and then either get the xauth secret or have the user do 'xhost +'.

At that point I'm gonna say the attacker earned their keylogger access.

And you or your distro might consider patching out the TCP variant.


Saying 'xhost +menger' and being able to run graphical apps from my university's Sun server -- OPEN LOOK apps at that -- on my local Linux machine was peak 1990s computing.

> the client might not be running as your user on your local machine

True, this is probably the only real use case. X11 forwarding in OpenSSH (ssh -X) does in fact use this extension by default.




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