Not many things rely on DNSSEC. Things that do rely on DNSSEC usually tend to have their own verifying resolver. (Because the idea of "we need signed DNS records, but we'll let google check that and maybe not even encrypt our connection to google" is not a very good one.)
Google overbid this bounty by something like $4,999. The root DNSSEC keys could land on Pastebin tomorrow and almost nobody in the entire industry would need to be paged, because virtually no one relies on DNSSEC --- even the people who performatively enable it aren't actually relying on it.
This sounds like hyperbole, but it's not. That's how much of a mess DNSSEC is. Try to reason through what kind of entity would need to get paged over a DNSSEC breach, and tabletop it. It's hard for me to think of anybody who would need to care; even the people who "use" DNSSEC could wait until their next maintenance window to respond.
Excuse me?
That's quite an urgent and serious bug and I'm afraid that is too low, especially from a $1TN dollar company with billions of users.