>> When any evidence comes out that shows that a specific portion of UG is probably not true, they crow triumphantly about how language is really fundamentally something ineffable and pseudo-mystical, not able to be computed by logic.
I think the overwhelming mass of work critical of Chomsky treats it as a computational object; the emphasis changes from global computability to local inference: what can a learner infer about the structural properties of a language? How can people parse complex sentence structures and ascribe meaning to them? Hence the rapid adoption of machine learning for explaining human behavior in psycholinguistics, developmental linguistics, and historical linguistics. Nothing pseudo-mystical there.
Sure, of course not all linguists who disagree with UG are anti-computationalists. (I don't know about "the overwhelming mass," but that is possibly the result of my exposure to a local concentration of anti-computationalists.) Many tentatively accept some sort of computability while rejecting the specific model of UG, as you correctly note.
My comment was directed at the author of the specific article, and at many functionalist and postmodernist linguists, who actively conflate the question of computability in general with the validity of UG as a specific model.
I think the overwhelming mass of work critical of Chomsky treats it as a computational object; the emphasis changes from global computability to local inference: what can a learner infer about the structural properties of a language? How can people parse complex sentence structures and ascribe meaning to them? Hence the rapid adoption of machine learning for explaining human behavior in psycholinguistics, developmental linguistics, and historical linguistics. Nothing pseudo-mystical there.